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Abstract
In the standard beauty contest game of Morris and Shin (2002), agents have to choose
actions in accordance with an expected fundamental value and with the conventional
value expected to be set by the market. In doing so, agents respond to fundamental
and coordination motives, respectively, the prevalence of either motive being set ex-
ogenously. Our contribution is to consider whether agents favor the fundamental or
the coordination motive as the result of a strategic choice. First, we extend the generic
beauty contest game by endogenizing the weight put on the coordination motive and
show that the mere presence of public information theoretically leads agents to fully
favor the coordination motive. The prevalence of the coordination motive over the fun-
damental one yields a disconnection of average actions from the fundamental. Second,
we test this game through a laboratory experiment. Subjects tend to conform to theoreti-
cal predictions, except when private information is very precise in comparison to public
information, qualifying the focal role of public information.
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1 Introduction
Human beings often seek to conform to social norms. This applies both to the behavioural
and cognitive levels. Rather than trying to get by themselves an accurate perception of
reality, individuals find it easier to follow others. Public information – as long as it reduces
strategic uncertainty – also helps to achieve better than private information the level of
conformity to which individuals aspire. Instances of such social conformity can be easily
found in many contexts, in particular in many economic contexts. Let us just evoke those
of financial markets and industrial organization.
• First, take Keynes’s metaphor of the beauty contest, the winner of which is the com-
petitor whose choice is closest to the average choice of all the participants. Applied
to stock markets, this means that investors who care about the short run valuation
of their capital more than about its expected yield in the long run, may become so
concerned with matching prospective market values that they are ready to disregard
relevant information on fundamentals. They rather look for any information allow-
ing to anticipate ”what average opinion expects the average opinion to be” (Keynes
1936, p. 156).
• Second, take price competition between suppliers of close substitutes. As substi-
tutability increases, information about the competitors’ price policy may become more
important than information about customers’ behavior: a firm may easily be thrown
out of the market if it fails to match the best price, be it in itself high or low from the
customers’ viewpoint. In this context, a public signal, which is also informative of
others’ decisions, responds to the competitors’ concern for coordination, which may
allow it to dominate any private signal, although more precise about fundamental
characteristics of demand.
Because public information can drastically reduce strategic uncertainty, it may induce a
preference for coordination as such, at the expense of fundamental motives colliding with
an irreducible fundamental uncertainty. In the just mentioned contexts, this means that
speculation may look more attractive for capitalists than investment (which is the intended
lesson of Keynes’s parable) or that managers’ concern for coordination may be encouraged
by firm owners in the framework of a delegation game (Cornand and Dos Santos Ferreira,
2020). Should rational agents all have access to a public signal received without noise and
have perfect control over the weight of the fundamental and coordination components of
their payoffs, they would make coordination all important, thus eliminating uncertainty.
Of course, this is true under full rationality. As soon as there is a doubt about others’
rationality, strategic uncertainty gets in and that conclusion may break down.
The aim of our paper is to conceptualize the choice to play a pure coordination game by
revisiting Keynes’s beauty contest and then to question whether the coordination motive
dominates the fundamental motive when homines sapientes are involved instead of homines
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œconomici. We propose a simple theoretical framework and its experimental test that allows
to understand under which informational circumstances subjects may be more interested
in coordinating their activities than in guessing the fundamental state of nature.
In the famous representation of Keynes’s beauty contest by Morris and Shin (2002,
henceforth MS), agents’ actions consist in choosing a value which is a compromise between
the anticipated fundamental value and the anticipated conventional value (the average of
all the agents’ actions). Under perfect information, agents can easily coordinate on the fun-
damental value, so that the fundamental and coordination motives coincide. By contrast,
under imperfect information, agents receive public and private signals about the unknown
fundamental value. Information being imperfect, agents have to form expectations on the
fundamental, and information being dispersed, they may find it difficult to coordinate.
Dispersed information generates a conflict between matching the fundamental value and
matching the conventional value, which expresses itself in an information cost. While the
terms of the trade-off between the fundamental and the coordination motives are exoge-
nously given in MS, we argue that players may be able to manipulate the weights that will
be put on the fundamental and the coordination motives.
The contribution of the present paper is twofold. First, from a theoretical point of view,
we consider the trade-off between the coordination and the fundamental motives not as
structural but as resulting from former strategic decisions. Those decisions may then end
up in the full crowding out of the fundamental motive. To this aim, we extend the MS
model to a two-stage game, in which agents first choose the weights they attribute to the
coordination and fundamental motives, before choosing the value that best matches the se-
lected combination of the two motives. We then show that there is an incentive for agents
to favor the coordination over the fundamental motive. This is the consequence of coor-
dination on a public signal entailing a lower information cost than the prediction of an
unknown fundamental. Information is the driving force for the coordination loss to be
weaker than the fundamental loss: as agents put more weight on the coordination motive,
they rely more on public information to estimate the average action, making it easier to
coordinate on a conventional value. The strategic choice to privilege convention results in
the limit in a total disconnection between the valuation activity and the fundamental.
Second, a natural way to test whether this theoretical disconnection of economic activi-
ties from fundamentals also emerges in practice is to bring the model to the lab. Our second
contribution thus consists in running an experiment on our extended version of the beauty
contest. We test the theoretical predictions of the extended valuation game through an ex-
periment. More precisely, we test whether under dispersed information human subjects
prefer to choose the fundamental or the coordination motive and how much weight they
put on the public signal depending on the game they chose to play. By varying the preci-
sion and the nature (public or private) of information, the experiment captures the impact
of different informational contexts on the choice to coordinate and thus on the consequent
disconnection of the actions from fundamentals. Overall, our experiment shows that sub-
jects play in line with theoretical predictions in the sense that they more often choose to
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play the coordination game and put more weight on the coordination motive when they
receive both public and private signals than when they receive two private signals. Varia-
tions in the relative precision of public and private signals do not affect such a conclusion,
since subjects always put more weight on the coordination than on the fundamental motive
at the first stage, correspondingly putting a larger weight on the public signal at the second
stage, and the more so the higher the (relative) precision of this signal. Because the fun-
damental is unknown, by choosing to ignore it (almost) entirely in their payoffs, subjects
are able to eliminate (almost) all uncertainty by coordinating on the public signal, thereby
maximizing their payoff.
An exception to this observation, which contradicts theoretical predictions under full ra-
tionality, is the case where public and private information precisions are very asymmetric.
A simple model of bounded rationality can rationalize this finding by taking into account
strategic uncertainty. Agents may consider that others play randomly. If an agent has good
reasons to believe that others’ actions will not be too different from her own (because the
precisions of public and private signals are not too asymmetric), she will naturally favor
the coordination motive. Otherwise, high asymmetry implying high precision of one of the
two signals, she will favor the fundamental motive. So, reducing the precision of public
information (as is sometimes advocated in the literature in the vein of MS) may not be suit-
able, as subjects still choose to play the coordination game unless the precisions of public
and private signals are very asymmetric.
Relation to the literature
Our paper contributes to the theoretical literature on beauty contest games initiated by
Morris and Shin (2002)1 and to its experimental counterparts (Cornand and Heinemann,
2014, Baeriswyl and Cornand, 2014, 2016, and Fehr et al., 2019).2 In contrast to this litera-
ture, the aim of the present paper is to focus on the strategic choice of the weights put on
the two motives of the beauty contest affecting the payoff structure, and not on the strate-
gic choice of the weights attributed to public and private information for a given payoff.
In addition, while the literature in the vein of Morris and Shin has concentrated on the so-
cial value of public information, a discussion of welfare issues is beyond the scope of the
present paper. This paper relates to Cornand and Dos Santos Ferreira (2020), where the
weights affecting the payoff structure in a differentiated duopoly can be manipulated by
firm owners at the first stage of a delegation game.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework. Section 3 develops the experimental design and Section 4 presents and com-
ments the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
1This literature largely expanded after Morris and Shin (2002) seminal contribution. See e.g. Angeletos and
Pavan (2007). Recent extensions include endogenous information, in the form of either observation of aggregate
outcomes (see e.g. Bayona, 2017), or information acquisition (see e.g. Hellwig and Veldkamp, 2009, Myatt and
Wallace, 2012, Colombo et al., 2014).
2Alternative specifications of coordination games under dispersed information, such as the global game ap-
proach, have been experimentally tested. See e.g. Cabrales et al. (2007) and Heinemann et al. (2004, 2009).
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2 Theoretical framework
MS introduce a beauty contest game in which agents’ decisions have to meet both a fun-
damental and a coordination motive. Their actions consist in choosing a value as close as
possible to the fundamental value and to the average action in the population, according
to a trade-off between the two motives. However, while the relative weight agents put
on each motive of MS’s beauty contest game is fully exogenous, we take it as a strategic
variable to be chosen at a preliminary stage. In other words, MS’s utility will be viewed
as the second stage payoff of a two-stage game, in which agents first choose the relative
weights they attribute to the coordination and fundamental motives before making the fi-
nal decision. This model accounts for the potential disconnection between the actions and
the fundamental in a very simple manner.
2.1 A two-stage valuation game under different kinds of information
There is a finite number n of agents. The utility function of individual i has two compo-
nents. The first component is a standard quadratic loss in the distance between the under-
lying fundamental value θ and i’s chosen value ai. The second component is the ‘beauty
contest’ term: the loss is increasing in the distance between i’s chosen action ai and the
average action 1n
∑
j aj . Formally, the utility of agent i is given by
u(a, θ; ri) = −(1− ri) (ai − θ)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
fundamental motive
− ri
ai − 1
n
∑
j
aj
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
coordination motive
, (1)
where a is the action profile over all the agents and ri is the weight agent i has decided to
put on the beauty contest term.3
The timing of the game is as follows. First, each agent i chooses ri: he evaluates which
motive he favors to maximize his utility (he somehow chooses ‘the game he wants to play’).
Second, each agent i chooses ai: he evaluates how to exploit his information to decide on
the value that matches the combination of motives he favored.
Under perfect information, any agent i would exactly know the fundamental value θ
and choose at the second stage a∗i = θ, so that there would be no conflict between the
fundamental and the coordination motives. As a consequence, (r, (θ, ..., θ)) would be a
subgame perfect equilibrium for any profile r.
Under imperfect but homogeneous information, diffused for instance by a noisy public sig-
nal y received by all agents between the two stages of the game, there would typically be
3MS take a third motive into account: each agent wants to choose an action close to the average action, but
would also like to succeed better than the others. In the MS framework, in which the set of agents is a continuum,
this competition motive appears as an externality: it influences the agents’ welfare, offsetting the influence of the
coordination motive, not their decisions. This is not the case in our context, as we consider a finite number of
agents and, in addition, a two-stage game. The competition motive may then play a significant role, which is
highlighted in Cornand and Dos Santos Ferreira (2019, 2020). Here, however, we have preferred to ignore this
motive in order to simplify the task of the participants to the experiment.
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some fundamental loss, but no coordination loss. Subgame perfection would then impose
the choice ri = 1 at the first stage, allowing to get a zero loss with certainty at the second
stage (with a = (y, ..., y)), and potentially disconnecting the equilibrium actions from the
fundamental. In this context, the public signal might well be biased (and not only noisy)
without changing the equilibrium payoffs. In other words, any sunspot would indifferently
perform its well-known coordinating role as soon as r = (1, ..., 1).
Following the literature in the vein of MS, we shall however assume imperfect and hetero-
geneous (or dispersed) information. Between the two stages of the game, each agent i receives
two signals on the unknown fundamental value θ. All agents receive an unbiased pub-
lic signal with a normally distributed error term: y = θ + η, with η ∼ N (0, 1/α). Each
agent i receives in addition an unbiased private signal: xi = θ + εi, with εi ∼ N (0, 1/β),
the εi’s being identically and independently distributed across agents and independently
distributed with respect to η. Thus, conditionally on the two signals y and xi received by
agent i, his expected value of the fundamental is a weighted arithmetic mean of those sig-
nals, with weights proportional to the corresponding precisions α and β: E(θ | xi, y) =
(αy + βxi)/(α+ β).
As the signal y is public, it conveys information not only on the fundamental, but also on
other agents’ actions. Should the two signals, say yi and xi, be both private, agent i would
have no information on others’ actions, about which he would be doomed to form the same
expectation as about the fundamental: E(θ | xi, yi) = (αyi + βxi)/(α + β) = E(aj | xi, yi),
for j 6= i. Here, with independently distributed signals, the agent’s response to each signal
is entirely determined by the relative precision of that signal. Of course, should the signals
be correlated, they would convey some additional information on others’ actions, and the
response to each signal would have to be modulated according to the weight put on the
coordination motive. With uncorrelated signals, however, we would be back to the perfect
information case, in the sense that there would be no conflict between the fundamental and
the coordination motives (any profile r decided at the first stage would do), even if the two
losses would now be positive.
So, let us keep one signal public and the other private. We further assume that α > 0
and β <∞, so that the public signal never ceases to be informative and the private signal to
be noisy about the fundamental. These assumptions insure that the public signal is always
relevant (as concerns the fundamental).
2.2 Subgame perfect equilibrium under dispersed information
We solve the model backwards, starting by the second stage and taking the ri’s as given. To
derive agent i’s expectation conditional on his information E (aj | xi, y) of any other agent
j’s action, we assume, following MS, that any agent j ∈ {1, ..., n} responds to the signals
by following the same linear strategy aj = κjy + (1− κj)xj . The solution to the problem
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maxai E (u (a, θ; ri) | xi, y) is given by
ai =
α
α+ β
+
β
α+ β
Riκ−i︸ ︷︷ ︸
κi
y +
β
α+ β
− β
α+ β
Riκ−i︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−κi
xi, (2)
with Ri ≡
ri
(
1− 1n
)2
1− ri + ri
(
1− 1n
)2 and κ−i = 1n− 1 ∑
j 6=i
κj
(see Appendix A.1 for details about this derivation).4 For any agent i, the best reply ai
is an arithmetic mean of the two signals y and xi received by that agent. The relative
weight κi (resp. 1 − κi) put on the public (resp. private) signal is equal to the relative
precision α/ (α+ β) (resp. β/ (α+ β)) of this signal plus (resp. minus) an index of the
concern for coordination of agent i. This concern for coordination increases with the relative
precision β/ (α+ β) of the private signal (deterring the agents from the public signal), with
the relative weight ri put on the coordination motive together with the number n of agents
(Ri is monotonically increasing in ri and in n) and with the average relative weight κ−i put
on the public signal by the other agents.
An alternative expression for κi, referring to the average κ = 1n
∑
j κj =
1
n ((n− 1)κ−i + κi),
instead of κ−i, is
κi =
α/β + Rin−1nκ
1 + α/β + Rin−1
. (3)
Here κi appears as an increasing function of α/β and, as nκ > α/ (α+ β), of Ri, hence of
ri.
To derive the subgame perfect equilibrium, we maximize with respect to ri the expected
utility of agent i at second stage equilibrium a∗ (r):
E (u (a∗ (r) , θ; ri)) (4)
= − 1
α
[
κ2i + (α/β) (1− κi)2 + ri
(
κ (κ− 2κi)
+α/βn
(
1
n
∑
j (1− κj)2 − 2 (1− κi)2
) )]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
l(ri,κi,κ−i,n,α/β)
,
with κ = 1n
∑
j κj (see Appendix A.2 for details about this derivation).
The limit case of an infinite number of agents allows a simple derivation of the subgame
perfect equilibrium. Indeed, in this case the loss function becomes
l
(
ri, κ
∗
i , κ
∗
−i, n, α/β
)
= κ∗2i + (α/β) (1− κ∗i )2 + riκ∗ (κ∗ − 2κ∗i ) . (5)
4Notice that we are excluding a second stage equilibrium with sunspots, since we want to focus on the role
of public information providing some content on the fundamental. Allowing for sunspots, we would obtain a
continuum of equilibria for r = 1 at the first stage, with any sunspot yielding a different second stage equilibrium.
As we shall see, the third game of our experimental design rules out the possibility of this kind of sunspots as
subjects are not provided with any other information than the signals on the fundamental.
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By the envelope theorem, we do not have to consider the impact of the variations of ri
through κ∗i , as ∂l
(
ri, κ
∗
i , κ
∗
−i, n, α/β
)
/∂κi = 0. Also, since by (2) and (3), with n → ∞,
κ∗i = (α/β + riκ
∗) / (1 + α/β), hence κ∗ = (α/β) / (α/β + 1− r), with r = 1n
∑
j rj , we see
that changes in ri cease to have a significant impact on κ∗ when n becomes indefinitely
large. As a consequence, it suffices to determine the signal of
κ∗ − 2κ∗i =
κ∗ (1 + α/β − 2ri)− 2α/β
1 + α/β
= − α/β
1 + α/β
α/β + 1 + 2 (ri − r)
α/β + 1− r . (6)
This expression is decreasing in ri and negative if ri = 1. So, either it is always negative
and the loss function is minimized at ri = 1, or it is positive at ri = 0, and we must compare
l
(·, κ∗i , κ∗−i,∞, α/β) at the two extremities of its domain:
l
(
1, κ∗i , κ
∗
−i,∞, α/β
)
=
α/β
1 + α/β
(1− κ∗)2 < α/β
1 + α/β
= l
(
0, κ∗i , κ
∗
−i,∞, α/β
)
, (7)
which leads to the same conclusion. We can accordingly formulate the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition In the limit case of an infinite number of agents, the unique subgame perfect equi-
librium (a dominant strategy equilibrium) is ((1, ..., 1) , (y, ..., y)), such that all the agents choose
at the first stage to play the coordination game and at the second stage to coordinate their actions on
the public signal.
Notice that this result, stemming from the fact that the fundamental loss is always heav-
ier than the coordination loss, which is an incentive to put all the weight on the latter, is
not trivial since the two losses depend on the weight ri through the decisions this weight
induces at the second stage of the game. In Appendix A.2, we show that this result is car-
ried over to a game with a finite number of agents, at least for the parameter values that
have been selected for the experiment. To conclude, we obtain the following predictions to
be tested by our experiment.
Theoretical predictions
1. As to the second stage of the game, the higher the relative precision of the public signal and
the higher the relative weight on the coordination motive, the more weight agents put on the
public signal (see equation (2)).
2. As to the first stage, agents put all the weight on the coordination motive (r = (1, ..., 1)),
which is a dominant strategy, whatever the relative precisions of the public and private signals.
This implies that agents all choose to coordinate their actions on the public signal at the second
stage (a = (y, ..., y)).
3. By contrast, the profile of the relative weights put on the two motives at the first stage is
arbitrary in the case where both signals are private (and uncorrelated). At the second stage,
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because of the coordination motive, the weight on the public signal when agents receive public
and private signals is higher than the weight put on any of the two private signals when
agents receive two private signals.
3 The experiment
One may question whether the theoretical predictions derived in Section 2 hold in practice,
when homines sapientes are involved in the valuation game instead of homines œconomici.
Recurring to a laboratory experiment represents a natural way to test these assumptions,
as real data may be difficult to collect and analyze.5 The theoretical model in Section 2
is adjusted to an experimental framework. We discuss in this section the chosen param-
eter values for each treatment, the corresponding theoretical prediction, and the general
procedure of the experiment.
3.1 Treatment parameters and equilibrium values
We conducted 14 sessions (2 per treatment) with a total of 252 participants. In each session,
18 participants were separated into 3 independent groups of 6 participants (in order to get
6 independent observations per treatment).
3.1.1 Adjusted theoretical predictions to a finite number of participants
We focus on the parameter values n = 6 and β/α ∈ {1/8, 1/2, 1, 2, 8}, which correspond
to the cases we deal with in the different treatments of our experiment, as explained in
Section 3.1.3. These parameter values ensure that we obtain the same theoretical predic-
tions as in the theoretical framework of Section 2 when n→∞. The simulations presented
in Appendix A.2 show that we obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in dominant
strategies, such that all agents choose to play the coordination game rather than the funda-
mental one or any mixture of the two.
3.1.2 Description of sessions
Each session consisted of 3 games, which amounted to a total of 35 periods. The first two
games (5 periods each) were intended to familiarize subjects with the experiment and are
considered as an incentivized training. Participants played within the same group during
the whole length of the experiment and did not know the identity of the other participants
of their group.
In every period, and for each group, a fundamental state Z was drawn randomly using
a uniform distribution from the interval [50, 950].6 Each period was divided into two sub-
5This is especially the case because precisely knowing what a fundamental value is may represent a difficult
task and because private information is by definition not available in practice.
6Note that participants were not told about the support of the distribution to avoid the skewness of the poste-
rior distribution.
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periods. In the first sub-period, subjects had to choose an integer between 0 and 10 in
order to decide how much weight they wanted to attribute to the coordination motive of
their utility function (decision D1). Then first sub-period outcomes were revealed and the
second sub-period started. In the second sub-period, each participant had to decide on a
decision D2 by moving a cursor only inside the interval, whose bounds were the minimum
of the two signals received on the fundamental minus two standard deviations of this signal
and the maximum of the signals plus two standard deviations of this signal.7 Indeed, to
make their decision D2, in game 3 participants would receive 2 signals, that depend on
treatments, as explained below. Participants also had to form estimations depending on
the game of the experiment. Indeed, participants had to provide their best estimation E1 of
the fundamental and their best estimation E2 of the average decision D¯2 of all participants
of the same group.8
The payoff in ECU (Experimental Currency Units) associated with participant i’s deci-
sions D1 and D2 is given by the formula:
400− (10−D1)(D2 − Z)2 −D1(D2 −D2)2. (8)
The payoff in ECU associated with participant i’s estimation E1 is given by:
200− (E1 − Z)2, (9)
and that with participant i’s estimation E2:
200− (E2 − D¯2)2. (10)
In game 1 (5 periods), after the first sub-period, the realized value of Z is commonly
revealed. In this game, no estimation is asked for and subjects are simply rewarded ac-
cording to (8). The interval for decisions is [0, 2000]. In game 2 (5 periods), after the first
sub-period, a common value s ∈ [0, 2000] independent from the unknown number Z is sent
to all participants. It corresponds to a sunspot. In this game, an estimation E2 is asked for
so that participants are rewarded according to both (8) and (10). The interval for decisions
is also [0, 2000]. In half of the sessions, for each treatment, we reversed the order of games
7The second sub-period was very similar to the experiments by Cornand and Heinemann (2014) and Baeriswyl
and Cornand (2014, 2016), which aimed at testing variations of the beauty contest game of MS. The design was
slightly modified as, contrary to Baeriswyl and Cornand, we allowed subjects to make choices outside the interval
defined by the two signals participants received on the fundamental. Instead, and differently from Cornand and
Heinemann, who made a restriction of possible choices on the interval defined by the public signal minus or
plus 20 and observed many decisions outside the interval defined by the signals, we proposed a screen design
that emphasized the position of signals on the interval of possible choices. See the example of screens provided in
Appendix B.2. This ensured that subjects mostly played inside the range defined by the signals, without too much
constraining their choices. As will be underlined later on in the paper, we indeed observed only few decisions
outside the range defined by the two signals.
8While both actions and estimations were incentivized, our analysis is not subject to problems of hedging if
participants are risk neutral. Indeed, incentives for estimations were designed much lower than those of actions
on purpose. Moreover, as becomes clear from Appendix B.3, there is a strong coherence between individual
estimations and decisions.
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1 and 2.9 Game 3 took place afterwards. In this game, Z was unknown but after the first
sub-period, subjects received signals on Z, whose nature (public or private) and precision
depended on the treatment. In this game, D1, D2, E1, and E2 were rewarded according to
(8), (9), and (10).
3.1.3 Treatments
In the third game, we considered the 7 following treatments:
Treatments 1 and 7 - Public vs. private signals, same precision Each participant receives
a private and a public signal. The private signal received by each participant is distributed
as xi = Z + εi with εi ∼ N(0, 1/β). The public signal received by every participant of
each group is distributed as y = Z + η with η ∼ N(0, 1/α). Whereas each participant may
receive a different private signal xi, the public signal y is the same for all participants. In
Treatment 1, α = β = 1/8. In Treatment 7, α = β = 1.
Treatments 2 and 5 - Public vs. private signals, the public signal being more precise
than the private one These treatments are the same as Treatment 1, except that the public
signal is more precise than the private one. In Treatment 2, β = 1/8 and α = 1. In Treatment
5, β = 1/16 and α = 1/8.
Treatments 3 and 4 - Public vs. private signals, the private signal being more precise than
the public signal These treatments are the symmetric of Treatments 2 and 5. In Treatment
3, β = 1 and α = 1/8. In Treatment 4, β = 1/8 and α = 1/16.
Treatment 6 - Private vs. private signals, same precision Each participant receives 2
private signals on Z. Each of the 2 private signals may have a different distribution: xi1 =
Z + εi1 with εi1 ∼ N(0, 1/β1) and xi2 = Z + εi2 with εi2 ∼ N(0, 1/β2). The private signals
may thus be different from one participant to the next. In Treatment 6, β1 = β2 = 1/8.
3.1.4 Summary
The choice of parameters for the experiment is summarized in Table 1 that also presents
the corresponding theoretical predictions.
We will proceed to comparisons between observations and theoretical values as well
as treatment comparisons. Comparing Treatments 1 and 6 directly allows to account for
the role of the public signal. Comparing Treatment 1 and any of the Treatments 2 to 5 and
Treatment 7 to Treatments 2 and 3 allows to evaluate the role of increasing/decreasing the
precision of either public or private signals.
9More precisely, the motivation behind the first two games was to raise participants’ awareness about the
fundamental value Z (game 1) and about common information (game 2), while keeping these games sufficiently
different from game 3.
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Tr. Game 3: Signals distributions Ei(θ) Ei(a¯) a∗i r∗i
1 y ∼ N(Z, 8), xi ∼ N(Z, 8) xi+y2 y y 1
2 y ∼ N(Z, 1), xi ∼ N(Z, 8) 8y+xi9 y y 1
3 y ∼ N(Z, 8), xi ∼ N(Z, 1) y+8xi9 y y 1
4 y ∼ N(Z, 16), xi ∼ N(Z, 8) y+2xi3 y y 1
5 y ∼ N(Z, 8), xi ∼ N(Z, 16) 2y+xi3 y y 1
6 xi1 ∼ N(Z, 8), xi2 ∼ N(Z, 8) xi1+xi22 xi1+xi22 xi1+xi22 {0, ...1}
7 y ∼ N(Z, 1), xi ∼ N(Z, 1) xi+y2 y y 1
Table 1: Experiment parameters and theoretical predictions
3.2 Procedure
Sessions were run between June and November 2016 at the LEES (Laboratoire d’Economie
Expe´rimentale de Strasbourg). Each session had 18 participants who were mainly students
from the University of Strasbourg (most were students in economics and sciences) and were
recruited through ORSEE.10 Subjects were seated in random order at PCs. Instructions were
then read aloud and questions answered in private. An example of instructions is given in
Appendix B.1. Throughout the sessions, students were not allowed to communicate with
one another and could not see each others’ screens. Each subject could only participate
in one session. Before starting the experiment, subjects were required to answer a few
questions to ascertain their understanding of the rules.11 The experiment started after all
subjects had given the correct answers to these questions.
After each period, subjects received some feedback about realized values and choices.12
Information about past periods from the same game was displayed during the decision
phase on the lower part of the screen. At the end of each session, the ECU earned were
summed up and converted into euros. A single period for each of games 1 and 2 was
randomly selected to be paid; five periods for game 3 were randomly selected. 1000 ECU
were converted to 6 euros. The average payoff was about 25 euros. Sessions lasted for
around 2 hours and 15 minutes.
10ORSEE is a web-based Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments developed by Greiner (2015).
The program of this experiment was designed with the web platform EconPlay (www.econplay.fr).
11The understanding questionnaire is available from the authors upon request.
12In game 3, they were informed about their own choice for D1, the choice for D1 of all other participants in
their group, their own private hint Xi, the common hint Y , the true value of Z, their own estimation E1 on Z,
their own estimation E2 on the average decision D2 in the group, their own decision D2, the average decision
D2 in the group, the distance between the average D2 in the group and Y , the distance between the average D2
in the group and X , their payoff associated with E1, their payoff associated with E2, their payoff associated with
D1 and D2, and the overall payoff for the period.
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4 Experimental results
The results of the experiment concerning game 3 are presented in the following manner.13
First, we analyze the first stage decision before focusing on the second stage decision.
Third, we check the coherence between first and second stage decisions. Statistical tests
are based on Mann-Whitney tests for between treatment comparisons and Wilcoxon rank
test when comparing observed data to theoretical predictions.14 Finally, we analyze payoff
incentives and convergence issues.
4.1 Playing the fundamental or the coordination game? An analysis of
D1
The first question we address is whether participants chose to play the fundamental or the
coordination game. Table 2 presents the average weight D110 participants attributed to the
coordination motive in the experiment in each group for each treatment. In order to get a
full picture of first stage decisions, the left panels of Figure 1 depict the relative frequency
of weights put by each participant on the coordination motive for each treatment.
Tr. 1 (α = β = 1/8) 2 (α = 1, β = 1/8) 3 (α = 1/8, β = 1) 4 (α = 1/16, β = 1/8) 5 (α = 1/8, β = 1/16) 6 (β1 = β2 = 1/8) 7 (α = β = 1)
Gr. 1 0.66 0.01 0.54 0.88 0.86 0.73 0.24
Gr. 2 0.71 0.55 0.06 0.58 0.85 0.10 0.31
Gr. 3 0.80 0.82 0.20 0.79 0.72 0.50 0.68
Gr. 4 0.65 0.68 0.79 0.26 0.46 0.37 0.43
Gr. 5 0.56 0.32 0.26 0.54 0.51 0.34 0.75
Gr. 6 0.40 0.99 0.00 0.22 0.50 0.04 0.77
Av. 0.63 0.56 0.31 0.54 0.65 0.35 0.53
Th. 1 1 1 1 1 {0, ...1} 1
Table 2: Average weight on the coordination motive
The average weight put on the coordination motive is different from theoretically pre-
dicted. Indeed, when participants received both public and private signals, they attributed
a lower weight to the coordination motive than the full theoretical weight of 1.15 However,
subjects played in line with theoretical predictions in the sense that they more often chose
to play the coordination game (Figure 1) and put more weight on the coordination motive
(Table 2) when they received both public and private signals than when they received two
private signals. There is a significant difference between Treatments 1 and 6 (p = 0.0547).
13Outcomes for games 1 and 2 show that participants properly understood the instructions and the games. In
game 1, participants mostly choseD1 = 0 and in 93% of cases over the 7 treatments, they played the fundamental
as decision D2. In game 2, participants mostly played D1 = 10 and in 56% of cases over the 7 treatments they
played the sunspot. Descriptive statistics for games 1 and 2 are available from the authors upon request.
14We also performed the same analysis and tests by considering only the last 10 periods of the experiment
(game 3). Results are unchanged. This robustness analysis is available from the authors upon request.
15When participants received two private signals, the theoretical weight on the coordination motive is indeter-
minate. The weight selected by participants is generally relatively low, although the variance from one group to
the next is high.
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Figure 1: Relative frequency of decisions D1 on the coordination motive (left panels) and
of weights on Y in decision D2 (right panels) per treatment
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Result 1 In line with theoretical predictions, subjects put more weight on the coordination
motive when they receive both public and private signals than when they receive two private signals.
According to theoretical predictions, variations in the relative precision of public and
private signals should not affect this conclusion. However, there are significant differences
between Treatments 1 vs. 3 (p = 0.0547) and Treatments 3 vs. 5 (p = 0.0782). As we shall
see, this finding can be rationalized thanks to a simple model of bounded rationality.
Let us reconsider the model of Section 2, now abandoning full rationality and subgame
perfection (which implied taking κ as a function κ∗(r)) and including instead strategic un-
certainty due to bounded rationality. Suppose that agent i behaves non-strategically, setting
at the second stage the weight κi = α/ (α+ β), with zero concern for coordination, and
taking other agents’ second stage strategies κ−i as constant, not as functions of r and so
ignoring in particular the influence of his own first stage strategy ri. This strategy is then
chosen by simply minimizing the loss function l (·, α/ (α+ β) , κ−i, n, α/β) defined by (4),
at given κ−i. Since this function is linear affine, we just have to look at the sign of the coef-
ficient of ri. Should agent i assume that the other agents intend to choose the same value
α/ (α+ β), so that κj = κi for any j, the coefficient of ri would be clearly negative, leading
to the solution ri = 1. However, if agent i is fully uncertain about the intended choice
of the other agents, he may conjecture that others play randomly:16 he assumes a random
choice of κj for j 6= i. Assuming the uniform distribution over [0, 1], the first moments are
m1 = 1/2 and m2 = 1/3, so that the coefficient of ri becomes:(
1− 1/n
2
+
(1/n)α/β
1 + α/β
)(
1− 1/n
2
− (2− 1/n)α/β
1 + α/β
)
+ (1/n)α/β
(
1− 1/n
3
− 2− 1/n
(1 + α/β)
2
)
. (11)
If α/β = 1, making again κi coincide with the mathematical expectation 1/2 of κj for j 6= i,
this coefficient is negative and we obtain the same result. However, as α/β becomes large
or small enough, making κi differ substantively from 1/2, this coefficient becomes positive,
leading to the solution ri = 0. Under the parameter configuration of our experiment, with
n = 6, the coefficient of ri is negative iff 0.226 < α/β < 16.62, so that the sole treatment
where it becomes positive is Treatment 3, with α/β = 0.125.
So in the case of limited reasoning, each agent neglecting the impact on other agents’
decisions of his own actions and conjecturing a pure random behavior of the other agents,
the preference for the coordination motive is restricted to situations that are not too asym-
metric regarding the precisions of the public and private signals. A strong asymmetry will
translate into a preference for the fundamental motive, as in Treatment 3.
When public and private information precisions are not too asymmetric (Treatments 1,
16This approach is close to that in terms of limited level of reasoning: it is similar to considering that an agent
considers that others have a lower level of reasoning. Limited level of reasoning is a standard assumption in the
beauty contest literature. See e.g. Nagel (1995), Hanaki et al. (2019).
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2, 4, and 5), variations in the relative precision of public and private information do not
mitigate the fact that subjects put more weight on the coordination rather than the funda-
mental motive at the first stage of the game. Because the fundamental is unknown, they
chose to ignore it in order to be rewarded more in accordance with the pure coordination
game.
By contrast, when public and private information precisions are asymmetric, subjects
rather chose the fundamental game (Treatment 3). This observation contradicts theoretical
predictions under full rationality. Indeed, according to the theory, subjects should choose
the coordination game whatever the level of relative precision of public and private signals.
In the lab, choosing the coordination game appeared too costly, as it typically entails a coor-
dination problem at the second stage. This behavior goes in the direction of the theoretical
predictions of our simple model of bounded rationality.
Result 2 When public and private information precisions are not too asymmetric, subjects tend
to put more weight on the coordination than on the fundamental motive at the first stage of the game.
Otherwise, for instance private information being relatively very precise, subjects tend to favor the
fundamental rather than the coordination motive at the first stage of the game. This behavior stands
in contrast with theoretical predictions under full rationality but can be rationalized by a simple
model of bounded rationality that captures strategic uncertainty.
4.2 Is the public signal a focal point? An analysis of D2
The second question we address is whether subjects focus on the public signal. In Ap-
pendix B.3, we check subjects’ rationality by considering whether subjects played inside
the interval defined by the signals they received. As only few decisions were outside this
interval, and because we want to define a weight on the public signal, we keep only deci-
sions inside this interval for our analysis.17
The average weight assigned in the experiment to the public signal in D2 is reported
in Table 3 for each treatment and each group. Theoretical|th.stage1 denotes the theoretical
weight on the public signal conditional on the theoretical weight in the first stage decision
r. Theoretical 1st order denotes the theoretical weight on the public signal in the theoretical
first order expectation on the fundamental, while Av. Observed 1st order denotes the aver-
age weight on the public signal in the observed first order expectation on the fundamental
E1.18 We start our analysis by comparing the observed weight on the public signal to the
theoretical weight on the public signal, before proceeding to a treatment comparison.
When participants received both public and private signals, the theoretical benchmark
17In Appendix B.3, we also show the optimality of decisionsD2 by checking that observed estimations are close
to theoretical values of estimations and that observed D2 is appropriate conditional on the estimations E1 and
E2 made on an individual basis.
18The weights on the public signal in the observed first order expectation E1 on the fundamental per group are
reported in Table 7 in Appendix B.3.
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Treatment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Group 1 0.68 0.54 0.59 0.87 0.78 0.50 0.53
Group 2 0.62 0.79 0.49 0.55 0.90 0.50 0.46
Group 3 0.71 0.78 0.28 0.76 0.59 0.49 0.55
Group 4 0.54 0.71 0.59 0.31 0.59 0.51 0.68
Group 5 0.60 0.74 0.23 0.53 0.72 0.49 0.76
Group 6 0.62 0.97 0.37 0.45 0.79 0.49 0.61
Average 0.63 0.76 0.43 0.58 0.73 0.50 0.60
Theoretical 1st order 0.50 0.89 0.11 0.33 0.67 0.50 0.50
Av. Observed 1st order 0.52 0.69 0.30 0.36 0.66 0.50 0.57
Theoretical|th.stage1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1
Table 3: Weight on the public signal Y in D2
conditional on the theoretical first stage decision (Theoretical|th.stage1) can be rejected.19
Note however that when participants got two private signals, they put equal weight on
each, in line with theoretical predictions.
Nevertheless, Table 3 shows that the weight participants attributed to the public signal
– when they received both public and private signals – is higher than the weight they
put on any of the signals when they received two private signals. There is a significant
difference between Treatments 1 and 6 (p = 0.0036). To get a more complete picture of the
focal role of the public signal, the right panels of Figure 1 present the relative frequency of
weights on the public signal per treatment. The higher the relative precision of the public
signal, the more subjects played the public signal itself at the second stage. Table 3 also
shows that the higher the relative precision of the public signal, the higher the weight
on the public signal. Indeed, there is a significant difference between Treatments 1 and 2
(p = 0.0782), 1 and 3 (p = 0.0103), Treatments 3 and 5 (p = 0.0091), and Treatments 2 and 7
p = 0.0547) and 3 and 7 (p = 0.0776). The difference in the relative precision of the public
signal needs to be sufficiently strong though to generate significant differences between
treatments (there is no significant difference between Treatments 1 and 4 (p = 0.4233),
and 1 and 5 (p = 0.1994)). These effects go in the sense of the theory, as when r 6= 1, an
increase in r implies a larger weight on the public signal. All these results are confirmed
on individual data (see Appendix B.4).
Result 3 The public signal plays a focal role. First, participants attribute a large weight to the
public signal when they receive private and public signals in comparison to the weight they attribute
to a private signal in a treatment where they receive two private signals. Second, in line with theory
19There is overreaction to the public signal in the sense that participants to the experiment attributed a larger
weight to the public signal in their decision D2 than in their stated first order expectation on the fundamental
(Observed 1st order) (results of Mann-Whitney tests for Treatments 1 and 4 are respectively p = 0.0064 and
p = 0.0250). Indeed, following Baeriswyl and Cornand (2016), overreaction is observed when comparing the
observed weight on the public signal to the weight in the stated first order expectation and not necessarily to
the theoretical weight in the first order expectation (Theoretical 1st order). Experimental overreaction to public
information has been largely documented in Cornand and Heinemann (2014) and Baeriswyl and Cornand (2014,
2016). We therefore do not comment much upon this issue, which is not the main focus of the current paper.
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at the second stage conditional on r 6= 1, the higher the relative precision of the public signal, the
more weight participants put on the public signal.
Recall that in the case of Treatment 3, our simple model of bounded rationality pre-
dicted that agents should choose ri = 1 at the first stage, implying that the weight on the
public signal at the second stage is given by 1/9 (theoretical first order expectation of the
fundamental). This can rationalize why the observed average weight on the public signal
in Treatment 3 is the lowest. The next section analyses in more details the relation between
decisions in the first and second stage of the game.
4.3 Is there coherence between decisions D1 and D2?
The third question we address is whether there is a coherence between observed first stage
and second stage decisions. To answer this question, we proceed in two steps. First, we
analyse whether the weight put on the public signal in decisionD2 better coincides with the
theoretical weight on the public signal once accounting for the stated first stage decision.
Second, we look at whether subjects put a larger weight on the public signal in their second
stage decisionD2 when they choose to be rewarded more by the coordination motive at the
first stage.
Table 4 proposes an alternative theoretical benchmark for assessing the weight put on
the public signal in decision D2, conditional on stated decisions D1. The comparison be-
tween observed weights on the public signal and the second stage theoretical value con-
ditional on the observed first stage decision D1 reveals a better fit than the unconditional
second stage theoretical value (as analysed in section 4.2.). Indeed, the theoretical bench-
mark cannot be rejected in Treatments 4 (p = 0.6310) and 7 (p = 0.1495).
Tr. 1 (σ2η = σ
2
ε = 8) 2 (σ
2
η = 1, σ
2
ε = 8) 3 (σ
2
η = 8, σ
2
ε = 1) 4 (σ
2
η = 16, σ
2
ε = 8) 5 (σ
2
η = 8, σ
2
ε = 16) 7 (σ
2
η = σ
2
ε = 1)
Gr. 1 0.73 0.89 0.20 0.78 0.92 0.56
Gr. 2 0.75 0.94 0.12 0.52 0.92 0.58
Gr. 3 0.81 0.97 0.13 0.67 0.86 0.73
Gr. 4 0.72 0.96 0.34 0.39 0.77 0.62
Gr. 5 0.67 0.92 0.14 0.50 0.79 0.78
Gr. 6 0.61 1.00 0.11 0.38 0.79 0.79
Av. 0.71 0.95 0.17 0.54 0.84 0.68
Table 4: Weight on the public signal Y in D2 conditional on observed D1
To address the question whether subjects put a larger weight on the public signal in
their second stage decision D2 when they choose to be rewarded more by the coordina-
tion motive at the first stage, we resort to an analysis on individual data and estimate the
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following equation, both for each treatment20 and for all the treatments taken together21:∣∣∣∣D2it −XitYt −Xit
∣∣∣∣ = Co+ γD1it10 + (it + νi), (12)
where Co is the constant, D1it is the decision D1 of individual i at period t and γ the
estimated coefficient; νi + it is the error term (νi is the individual specific error term and
it is the idiosyncratic error term).
All Tr1 Tr2 Tr3 Tr4 Tr5 Tr6 Tr7
Constant 0.5477*** 0.5224*** 0.6933*** 0.3688*** 0.4970*** 0.6892*** 0.4963*** 0.5697***
(0.0226) (0.0205) (0.0443) (0.0431) (0.0634) (0.0478) (0.0068) (0.0444)
D1it
10 0.0990*** 0.1718*** 0.0856*** 0.1495* 0.1480*** 0.0622* 0.0021 0.0535
(0.0184) (0.0449) (0.0240) (0.0873) (0.0174) (0.0333) (0.0096) (0.0556)
νi 0.1965 0.1607 0.1793 0.2024 0.2213 0.1975 0.0000 0.1824
it 0.1753 0.1628 0.1580 0.2262 0.1735 0.1732 0.1458 0.1738
δ 0.5569 0.4935 0.5628 0.4446 0.6195 0.5651 0.0000 0.5240
N 6014 860 795 848 884 873 883 871
R2within 0.0151 0.0624 0.0133 0.0183 0.0355 0.0110 0.0000 0.0032
R2between 0.2673 0.2468 0.2096 0.2462 0.4243 0.0268 0.0018 0.2887
R2overall 0.1508 0.1633 0.1287 0.1261 0.2750 0.0192 0.0000 0.1300
χ2 28.8211 14.6090 12.7734 2.9279 72.0911 3.4918 0.0466 0.9269
Cluster robust standard errors are reported in the first column to control for individual and group specific heterogeneity among the treatments
For the remaining models, cluster robust standard errors to control for group specific heterogeneity are given in parentheses.
Table 5: Random effects model - Equation (12)
Results22 presented in Table 5 show that the choice of D1 always exerts a positive and
significant impact on the weight put on Y in D2, except in Treatment 6 (in which subjects
received two private signals) and in Treatment 7 (where uncertainty was very low), which
means that there is a coherence between choices D1 and D2, in line with the theoretical
prediction.
Result 4 In line with theoretical predictions, a higher average weight on the coordination motive
implies a larger weight on the public signal.
4.4 Payoff incentives and convergence
While previously stated results mainly go in the direction of the theory, an important de-
viation from theory is observed when the precisions of public and private information are
asymmetric (Treatment 3). How can payoff incentives account for this deviation?
20Clusters were used for groups.
21Clusters were used for both treatments and groups.
22Note that δ corresponds to the proportion of variation due to the individual specific term. If δ is large (i.e.
80%), the main proportion is explained by the individual specific term and the rest due to idiosyncratic error term.
***, ** and * respectively indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% conventional levels.
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Figure 2 illustrates how payoffs are related to the weight assigned to the coordination
motive in the first stage (left panels) and to the weight attributed to the public signal in the
second stage (right panels). The dashed lines represent the realized payoffs according to
the weights played in the experiment (on the x-axis). The solid line exhibits the theoretical
payoffs for an agent deviating (on the x-axis) on the left panels from the equilibrium strat-
egy in the first stage, given that all agents play the optimal behaviour at the second stage23
and on the right panels from the equilibrium strategy in the second stage, given that all
agents play the optimal behaviour at the first stage.
Because the payoff function is quadratic, payoffs are very flat around the maximum.
Looking at the various measures of realized and expected payoffs, one can note neverthe-
less that deviations from first stage equilibrium are less costly in Treatments 2 and 7 and
more costly in Treatment 4. They are equally intermediary costly in the remaining Treat-
ments 1, 3 and 5. Despite similar incentives in the latter treatments, average weight on
the coordination motive are quite different in Treatment 3 in comparison to the other treat-
ments. This can be rationalized by the fact that playing the second stage optimal weight
(or close to it) was very costly in Treatment 3 because other subjects deviated from the first
stage optimum, in accordance with their low second stage weight (as analysed in 4.3). This
translated in losses in realized payoffs from playing weight 1 or close to 1 on the public
signal at the second stage (third left panel).
The average decisions D1 and weights on the public signal in D2 over periods are rep-
resented by the thick black lines on respectively the right and left panels of Figure 3. Some
convergence is observed especially in Treatments 1, 2, 5 and 7. Although deviations were
costly in Treatment 4, no convergence is observed. In conformity with the analysis of payoff
incentives, no convergence is observed in Treatment 3. Finally, no convergence is observed
in Treatment 6 as there is a relatively small initial deviation of the average weight on the
public signal in decisions D2 from the equilibrium.
Figure 3 also plots the relative frequency of decisions D1 (left panels) and weights as-
signed to the public signal (right panels) per period for each treatment. It shows how the
role of focal points evolves over time. Whereas the focal point 10 for D1 becomes more
important (and the focal point 0 less important) over periods in Treatments 1, 2, 4, 5 and
7, it does not become more important in Treatment 3. Accordingly, the focal point 1 for
the weight on Y in D2 also tends to become more important, especially in Treatments 1, 2
and 5. This indicates that subjects learn over periods that playing 10 in D1 and Y for D2
is associated with a rather good payoff in the Treatments 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7, but with a bad
observed payoff in Treatment 3.
Result 4 Convergence in the direction of theory is observed in all treatments with public and
private information, except when the precisions of public and private are asymmetric.
23In Treatment 6, such theoretical prediction cannot be derived since there are multiple equilibria in the first
stage of the game.
19
150
200
250
300
350
400
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P
a
y
o
ff
Weight on the coordination motive
Treatment 1
Theoretical payoff
Realised payoff
a e
260
280
300
320
340
360
380
400
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
P
a
y
o
ff
Weight on the public signal
Treatment 1
Theoretical payoff
Realised payoff
a e
150
200
250
300
350
400
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P
a
y
o
ff
Weight on the coordination motive
Treatment 2
Theoretical payoff
Realised payoff
a e
260
280
300
320
340
360
380
400
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
P
a
y
o
ff
Weight on the public signal
Treatment 2
Theoretical payoff
Realised payoff
a e
150
200
250
300
350
400
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P
a
y
o
ff
Weight on the coordination motive
Treatment 3
Theoretical payoff
Realised payoff
a e
150
200
250
300
350
400
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P
a
y
o
ff
Weight on the coordination motive
Treatment 4
Theoretical payoff
Realised payoff
a e
150
200
250
300
350
400
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P
a
y
o
ff
Weight on the coordination motive
Treatment 5
Theoretical payoff
Realised payoff
a e
150
200
250
300
350
400
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P
a
y
o
ff
Weight on the coordination motive
Treatment 6
Realised payoff
150
200
250
300
350
400
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P
a
y
o
ff
Weight on the coordination motive
Treatment 7
Theoretical payoff
Realised payoff
a e
260
280
300
320
340
360
380
400
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
P
a
y
o
ff
Weight on the public signal
Treatment 3
Theoretical payoff
Realised payoff
a e
260
280
300
320
340
360
380
400
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
P
a
y
o
ff
Weight on the public signal
Treatment 4
Theoretical payoff
Realised payoff
a e
260
280
300
320
340
360
380
400
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
P
a
y
o
ff
Weight on the public signal
Treatment 5
Theoretical payoff
Realised payoff
a e
260
280
300
320
340
360
380
400
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
P
a
y
o
ff
Weight on one of the two private signals
Treatment 6
Theoretical payoff
Realised payoff
a e
260
280
300
320
340
360
380
400
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
P
a
y
o
ff
Weight on the public signal
Treatment 7
Theoretical payoff
Realised payoff
a e
Figure 2: Realized payoffs and payoff incentives; e: theoretical equilibrium weight D1, a:
realized average weight
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Figure 3: Relative frequency of decisions D1 and weights assigned to the public signal per
period for each treatment
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5 Conclusion
Our model intends to capture the common interest agents may have in coordinating on
the same action. Indeed, although inherent to Keynes’ beauty contest metaphor, we be-
lieve that the idea that agents may exhibit a common interest in coordination per se has
not yet received sufficient attention. The main contribution of this paper is to approach as
strategic decisions the weights put by the participants in a beauty contest on the coordina-
tion and fundamental motives compounding their payoffs. These strategic decisions end
up in the complete dominance of the coordination motive, crowding out the fundamental
motive and hence resulting in a disconnection of participants’ actions from fundamentals.
While this disconnection between actions and fundamentals is trivial in the case where all
the weight is exogenously put on the coordination motive, it becomes a crucial result in a
context where agents may manipulate the weights on each motive.
We have developed a game focusing on how the information cost due to imperfect in-
formation may be the source of the disconnection between fundamentals and activity, and
proposed an experiment aiming at testing this theoretical prediction. While participants
in the lab tend indeed to favor the coordination motive over the fundamental motive, our
experiment qualifies theoretical predictions when the precisions of public and private in-
formation are strongly asymmetric, one of them becoming very high. This makes coordi-
nation relatively costly, avoiding the disconnection from fundamentals. A simple model of
bounded rationality can account for this observation.
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A Theory
A.1 Derivation of the second stage equilibrium
Recall that the problem of agent i at stage 2 is to maximize in ai the expected utility value
E (u (a, θ; ri) | xi, y), where E(. | xi, y) is the expectation operator conditional on the two
signals received, and where the utility function u is given by
u(a, θ; ri) = −(1− ri) (ai − θ)2 − ri
ai − 1
n
∑
j
aj
2 . (13)
The first order condition yields
ai =
(1− ri)E (θ | xi, y) + ri
(
1− 1n
)2 1
n−1
∑
j 6=i E (aj | xi, y)
1− ri + ri
(
1− 1n
)2 . (14)
Thus, the optimal action ai is a weighted arithmetic mean of the expected fundamental
value and of the expected average action of the other agents.
To derive E (aj | xi, y) for j 6= i we assume that any agent j follows the same linear
strategy: aj = κjy+ (1− κj)xj . We denote κ−i = 1n−1
∑
j 6=i κj , so that (using E(θ | xi, y) =
(αy + βxi)/(α+ β)),
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
E (aj | xi, y) = κ−iy + (1− κ−i)αy + βxi
α+ β
(15)
=
α+ κ−iβ
α+ β
y +
(1− κ−i)β
α+ β
xi.
Notice that, in the case of a second private signal yi instead of the public signal y, we
would simply have 1n−1
∑
j 6=i E (aj | xi, yi) = E(θ | xi, yi), hence ai = E(θ | xi, yi) and
κi = α/ (α+ β), independently from ri. In the case we are examining, of a public and a
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private signal, by inserting (15) in (14), we obtain for the optimal action of agent i:
ai =
α
α+ β
y +
β
α+ β
xi +
ri
(
1− 1n
)2 κ−iβ
α+β (y − xi)
1− ri + ri
(
1− 1n
)2 (16)
=
(
α
α+ β
+
β
α+ β
Riκ−i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
κi
y +
(
β
α+ β
− β
α+ β
Riκ−i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−κi
xi,
where
Ri ≡
ri
(
1− 1n
)2
1− ri + ri
(
1− 1n
)2 . (17)
A.2 Derivation of the subgame perfect equilibrium
To derive the subgame perfect equilibrium, we have to determine the first stage payoff, that
is, the expected utility to be maximized with respect to the decision variable ri:
E (u (a∗ (r) , θ; ri)) (18)
= − (1− ri)E (a∗i (ri, r−i)− θ)2 − riE
a∗i (ri, r−i)− 1n∑
j
a∗j (rj , r−j)
2
= − (1− ri)E (κ∗i η + (1− κ∗i ) εi)2 − riE
(
(κ∗i − κ∗) η + (1− 1/n) (1− κ∗i ) εi
− 1n
∑
j 6=i
(
1− κ∗j
)
εj
)2
= − 1
α
[
κ∗2i +
α
β
(1− κ∗i )2 + ri
(
κ∗ (κ∗ − 2κ∗i )
+α/βn
(
1
n
∑
j
(
1− κ∗j
)2 − 2 (1− κ∗i )2)
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
l(ri,κ∗i ,κ∗−i,n,α/β)
By the envelope theorem, since κ∗i is a second stage equilibrium value (a
∗
i (r) = κ
∗
i y +
(1− κ∗i )xi), we do not have to care about the impact on the first stage payoff of a variation
in ri through κ∗i . Furthermore, we can replace the vector κ
∗
−i by the mean value κ
∗ in
order to reduce the arguments of the loss function which depend on ri. It is clear that
a higher dispersion of agents’ decisions (a larger value of 1n
∑
j
(
1− κ∗j
)2, given κ∗), by
augmenting the coefficient of ri in l
(
ri, κ
∗
i , κ
∗
−i, n, α/β
)
, can only discourage coordination
(the choice of a high ri). In order to show that agent i has still an incentive to choose a high
ri when confronted to a large dispersion of other agents’ actions, we shall consider the
worst case, that of the highest value of 1n−1
∑
j 6=i (1− κj)2 compatible with a given value
of the mean κ∗ (hence of κ∗−i =
n
n−1
(
κ∗ − 1nκ∗i
)
). This case results from taking the κj ’s
symetrically disposed at a maximum distance about the mean κ∗. Given the number n of
agents and referring to the optimal value of κ∗i (as given by (3)), such procedure allows to
reduce the arguments of the re-defined loss function to the decision variable ri plus only
two parameters, the mean κ and the ratio of precisions α/β: L (ri, κ, α/β). Finally, the
admissible values of κ (those compatible with a second stage equilibrium) must belong to
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the interval [α/ (α+ β) , 1], since the concern for coordination (an increasing function of ri)
can only augment its fundamental value α/ (α+ β).
For n = 6, the number of participants in each session of our experiment, this procedure
leads us to consider four κj ’s symetrically disposed, at a maximum distance, about the
mean κ, plus a residual κj coinciding with the mean. Thus, 1n−1
∑
j 6=i (1− κj)2 takes the
value
2 (1)
2
+ 2 (1− 2κ)2 + (1− κ)2
5
= 1.8κ2 − 2κ+ 1 if 0 ≤ κ ≤ 0.5 and
2 (0)
2
+ 2 (2− 2κ)2 + (1− κ)2
5
= 1.8 (1− κ)2 if 0.5 ≤ κ ≤ 1. (19)
In order to determine the value of ri which minimizes the loss function L (·, κ, α/β), we
thus perform simulations with this function for the parameter valuesα/β ∈ {1/8, 1/2, 1, 2, 8}
used in our experiment. These simulations, represented in the following figure, show that
the loss function is decreasing in ri for most parameter values. Monotonicity is lost only
for low relative precision of the public signal (α/β = 1/8 and α/β = 1/2) together with a
large weight κ put on the public signal (because of a high concern for coordination). How-
ever, L (·, κ, α/β) is then stricly concave, with L (1, κ, α/β) < L (0, κ, α/β). We conclude
that the loss function L (·, κ, α/β) is always minimized at ri = 1 in the cases relevant for
our experiment.
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B Experiment
B.1 Example of instructions
We present a translation from French to English of the instructions for Treatment 1. Instruc-
tions for other treatments are available from the authors upon request.
Instructions
Hello and welcome to our laboratory
You will participate to an experiment on decision making. If you carefully follow the instructions,
your decisions will allow you to earn a considerable amount of money. To this aim, do not hesitate
to ask questions.
The money you will earn during this experiment will partly depend on your decisions, those of
the other participants and randomness. All decisions are treated anonymously and you will never
have to enter your name on the computer. The amount of money you will earn during the experiment
is paid individually at the end of the experiment.
You are 18 people participating in this experiment. Three groups of 6 people are formed. These
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three groups are completely independent and do not interact with each other for the whole length of
the experiment. Each participant interacts only with the other participants of his group. The present
instructions describe the rule of the game for a group of 6 participants and all participants have the
same instructions.
Framework of the experiment
The experiment consists of 3 games. You may receive some payoffs for each of these three
games. The overall payoff earned during the experiment is equal to the sum of payoffs
obtained in each of the three games. Note that each game is paid independently, in the
sense that if the payoff of a single game is negative, it will be set to zero. The three games
do not compensate each other in terms of payoffs. The exchange rate is 1000 ECU = 6 euros.
First game of the experiment:
Running of the game:
This game lasts for 5 periods and each period consists in 2 sub-periods. At the beginning
of each period, the computer randomly selects a positive number Z. This positive number
is different in each period, but is identical for all the participants of a same group. You will
know the true value of Z after the first sub-period, and before making your decision for the
second sub-period.
Each period is divided into two sub-periods to which two decisions are associated: D1
and D2, where D1 is your decision in the first sub-period, and D2 your decision in the
second sub-period.
At each period, your payoff in ECUs associated with your decisions is given by the
following formula:
400− (10−D1)(D2 − Z)2 −D1(D2 − sc averageofdecisionsD2sc inthegroup)2
Running of sub-period 1 :
During the first sub-period, you have to make a decision D1 by choosing an integer num-
ber between 0 and 10. The following formula indicates that, owing to your choice of D1
between 0 and 10, you choose how to be paid:
• By choosing D1 = 10, you choose to be paid only according to the distance between
your decision D2 and the average of decisions D2 in your group.
Your payoff is given by the formula:
400− 10(D2 − sc averageofdecisionsD2sc inthegroup)2.
• By choosing D1 = 0, you choose to be paid only according to the distance between
your decision D2 and the value of the number Z that you will know.
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Your payoff is given by the following formula: 400− 10(D2 − Z)2.
• By choosing D1 strictly between 0 and 10, you choose to be paid according to these
two distances, that is:
i) both according to the distance between your decision D2 and the average of
decisions D2 in your group,
ii) and according to the distance between your decision D2 and the value of the
number Z, that you will know at the beginning of sub-period 2, that is before
making your decision D2.
You can choose to put more or less weight on one or the other distance. The closer your
D1 to 0, the more you will be rewarded according to the distance between your decision
D2 and the value of Z.
Conversely, the closer your D1 to 10, the more you will be rewarded according to the
distance between your decision D2 and the average of decisions D2 in your group.
Therefore, if it seems easier for you to estimate Z, you will certainly prefer to be re-
warded according to the distance between your decision D2 and the number Z. To the
contrary, if it seems easier for you to estimate the average of decisions D2 in your group,
you will certainly prefer to be rewarded according to the distance between your decision
D2 and the average of decisions D2 in your group.
Running of sub-period 2 :
During the second sub-period, you have to make a decision D2 by choosing a number
between 0 and 2000. The preceding formula indicates that, owing to your choice D2, your
payoff gets higher the closer your decision D2 to:
• either the known number Z;
• or the average of decisions D2 in your group;
• or both.
Note that owing to your decision D1 (that you will previously have made in sub-period
1), you will have chosen the relative importance of the proximity between your D2 and the
known number Z on the one hand, and between your D2 and the average of decisions D2
in your group on the other.
To maximize your payoff associated to your choice of D2, you have to account for the
choice of D1 that you will have previously made: the fact to be close to the average of
decisions D2 in your group will matter for the choice of your decision D2, the more so the
higher decision D1.
Conversely, the fact to be close to Z will matter for the choice of your decision D2, the
more so the closer decision D1 to 0.
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By your choice of D1, you can even choose to be paid only according to a single of these
two distances.
Before making decision D2, you will be informed about the decisions D1 of all other
participants in your group.
A single period of this game will be randomly selected to be paid at the end of the
experiment.
Second game of the experiment:
Running of the game:
The second game also lasts for 5 periods, and is identical to the first game except that this
time, you will not know the true value of Z before making your decision for the second
sub-period.
At each period, your payoff in ECUs associated with your decisions is again given by
the following formula:
400− (10−D1)(D2 − Z)2 −D1(D2 − sc averageofdecisionsD2sc inthegroup)2,
where D1 is your decision in sub-period 1 and D2 your decision in sub-period 2.
The running of sub-period 1 for this game is strictly identical to the sub-period of the
first game of the experiment.
During the second sub-period, to ease your choice of D2, we ask you, on top of making
decision D2, to also form an estimation E2 on the average of decisions D2 in your group,
which payoff will be:
200− (E2 − sc averageofdecisionsD2sc inthegroup)2.
Before making your decision D2, you will be informed about the decision D1 of all the
other participants.
However, contrary to the first game of the experiment, none of the participants will
know the true value of Z when making his decisions E2 and D2.
Nevertheless, at the second sub-period, each participant observes the same common
value S: it is identical to all participants in your group. This common value S contains no
information on the unknown number Z. This common value S is not centered on Z and is
not distributed on the same support as Z. It has therefore no link with Z.
A single period of this game will be randomly selected to be paid at the end of the
experiment.
Third game of the experiment:
Running of the game:
The third game lasts for 25 periods and is identical to the first game, except that this time,
you will not know the true value of Z before making your decisions of sub-period 2.
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At each period, your payoff in ECUs associated with your decisions is again given by
the following formula:
400− (10−D1)(D2 − Z)2 −D1(D2 − sc averageofdecisionsD2sc inthegroup)2,
where D1 is your decision in the sub-period 1 and D2 your decision in sub-period 2.
The running of sub-period 1 for this game is strictly identical to the first sub-period of
the first game of the experiment.
During the second sub-period, to ease your choice of D2, we ask you, on top of making
your decision D2, to form two estimations E1 and E2:
• an estimation of the true value of Z, which payoff will be: 200− (E1−Z)2. The closer
your estimation E1 to Z, the higher your payoff from E1;
• an estimation E2 of the average of decisions D2 in the group, which payoff will be:
200− (E2 − sc averageofdecisionsD2sc inthegroup)2. The closer your estimation E2
to the average of decisions D2 in the group, the higher your payoff from E2.
Before making your decisionD2, you will be informed about the decisionD1 of all other
participants. As previously, none of the participants will know the true value of Z before
making decisions D1 and D2.
However, at the second sub-period, each participant receives two hints, X and Y on the
unknown number Z, as explained below.
• Private hint X
Each participant receives at each second sub-period a private hintX on the unknown
number Z. Each private hint is centered on Z and contains an error that is randomly
selected from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σx = 2.83.
Given the properties of the normal distribution, this means that in 95% of cases, your
private hint X is inside the interval [Z − 5.66;Z + 5.66]. Your private hint and the
private hints of the other participants are selected independently from each other, so
that each participant will receive a private hint that can be different from those of
the other participants.
• Common hint Y
On top of your private hint X , you, as well as the other participants in your group,
will receive at each second sub-period, a common hint Y on the unknown number
Z. This common hint is also centered on Z and contains an error that is randomly
selected from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σy = 2.83.
Given the properties of the normal distribution, this means that in 95% of cases, the
common hint Y is inside the interval [Z − 5.66;Z + 5.66]. This common hint Y is the
same for all participants in your group.
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Graphical example:
Distinction between private hint X and common hint Y
The private hint X and the common hint Y have the same precision (same standard de-
viation): both hints are equally informative on the unknown number Z. The sole distinc-
tion between both hints is that each participant observes a private hint X that is different
from those of the other participants, while all participants observe the same common hint
Y .
Interval for decisionsE1,E2 andD2 In order to limit the spread between your decisions
and the true value of Z, the interval for decisionsE1, E2 andD2 will be set to [X−5.66;Y +
5.66] if the common hint Y is above the private hint X , and to [Y − 5.66;X + 5.66] in the
opposite case.
How to make your estimations E1 and E2?
To make your estimations E1 and E2, we ask you to select a number inside the interval
of decisions owing to a cursor. Nevertheless, as you do not know the errors in your hints,
it is natural to choose for your estimations numbers inside the interval defined by your
private hint X and the common hint Y . You thus have to combine your two hints in order
to maximize the payoffs associated with these two estimations. These estimations intend
to ease your choice for decisions D2.
How to make decision D2?
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Similarly, we ask you to select a number inside the interval of decisions owing to a
cursor. Nevertheless, as you do not know the errors in your hints, it is natural to choose
for your decision D2 a number inside the interval defined by your private hint X and the
common hint Y . You thus have to combine your two hints in order to maximize your
payoff associated with your decisions D1 and D2.
The graph below presents an example explaining how to make a decision D2:
Five periods of this game will be randomly selected to be paid at the end of the experi-
ment.
Payoffs: At the end of this third game, one of the participants to the experiment will
be randomly selected and will loudly announce to the other participants the periods that
will be selected for the payoffs of the three games. Your total payoff for the experiment will
consist in the sum of the payoffs obtained in the first, second and third games. In case of
negative payoff at one of these games, this payoff will be set to zero.
Before the beginning of the experiment, you will be asked questions in order to make sure you
understood the instructions.
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B.2 Example of screens
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B.3 Rationality: optimality of decisions D2?
Playing inside the interval In most cases, participants played inside the interval defined
by the two signals although this was not made compulsory by the design (contrary to
Baeriswyl and Cornand (2014, 2016)). As shown in Table 6, only 285 decisions over 6300
were outside this interval, which represents 4.5% of decisions.24 This proportion contrasts
with that obtained in Cornand and Heinemann (2014), owing to our design that showed
the positions of signals on the interval of possible decisions.
Coherence between estimations and decisions As shown in Tables 7 and 9, estimations
E1 are relatively close to theoretical values. For Treatments 1, 4, 5, and 6, statistical equality
cannot be rejected. There is however a significant difference for Treatments 2 and 3 (which
exhibit extreme theoretical weights on the public signal).
24We accounted for the missing data by performing a bootstrap analysis in Appendix B.4.
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= 8, σ2ε2
= 8) 7 (σ2η = σ
2
ε = 1)
Gr. 1 2 39 11 0 3 1 2
Gr. 2 1 28 10 2 1 2 11
Gr. 3 11 4 19 2 3 1 9
Gr. 4 2 21 3 4 2 9 2
Gr. 5 23 11 0 3 5 4 5
Gr. 6 0 2 9 5 13 0 0
Sum 39 105 52 16 27 17 29
Table 6: Number of decisions outside the interval defined by the two signals per group and
treatment
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ε = 8) 5 (σ
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η = 8, σ
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ε = 16) 6 (σ
2
ε1
= 8, σ2ε2
= 8) 7 (σ2η = σ
2
ε = 1)
Gr. 1 0.59 0.55 0.27 0.39 0.69 0.51 0.52
Gr. 2 0.53 0.70 0.30 0.45 0.79 0.49 0.52
Gr. 3 0.49 0.58 0.28 0.40 0.48 0.50 0.50
Gr. 4 0.48 0.72 0.38 0.29 0.55 0.50 0.62
Gr. 5 0.52 0.75 0.19 0.30 0.67 0.48 0.62
Gr. 6 0.52 0.84 0.36 0.35 0.79 0.50 0.64
Av. 0.52 0.69 0.30 0.36 0.66 0.50 0.57
Th. 0.50 0.94 0.06 0.33 0.67 0.50 0.50
Table 7: Weight on Y in E1
As shown by Tables 8 and 10, estimations E2 are always below the extreme theoretical
weight of 1 on the public signal,25 but larger than the equal weight of 0.5.
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ε1
= 8, σ2ε2
= 8) 7 (σ2η = σ
2
ε = 1)
Gr. 1 0.79 0.55 0.73 0.92 0.83 0.50 0.58
Gr. 2 0.73 0.75 0.44 0.55 0.90 0.49 0.63
Gr. 3 0.80 0.79 0.39 0.84 0.63 0.51 0.59
Gr. 4 0.66 0.70 0.61 0.60 0.62 0.51 0.71
Gr. 5 0.59 0.72 0.29 0.73 0.73 0.49 0.85
Gr. 6 0.65 0.97 0.38 0.60 0.79 0.47 0.63
Av. 0.70 0.75 0.47 0.71 0.75 0.49 0.66
Th. 1 1 1 1 1 0.50 1
Table 8: Weight on Y in the estimation E2
25In Treatment 6 where subjects received two private signals, however, estimations are in line with theory.
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Tr. 1 − Th. Tr. 2 − Th. Tr. 3 − Th. Tr. 4 − Th. Tr. 5 − Th. Tr. 6 − Th. Tr. 7 − Th.
0.7532 0.0277 0.0277 0.2489 0.9165 0.9165 0.0277
Table 9: Weight on Y in E1 in game 3: comparison between observed weight on Y in E1
and theoretical weight in E(θ), p-values for the Wilcoxon rank test
Tr. 1 − Th. Tr. 2 − Th. Tr. 3 − Th. Tr. 4 − Th. Tr. 5 − Th. Tr. 6 − Th. Tr. 7 − Th.
0.0277 0.0277 0.0277 0.0277 0.0277 0.4631 0.0277
Table 10: Weight on Y in E2 in game 3: comparison between observed weight on Y in E2
and theoretical weight in E(D¯2), p-values for the Wilcoxon rank test
To obtain a more detailed picture of coherence between estimations and decisions, we
estimate whether the weight put on the public signal in D2 is highly dependent the op-
timal weight on the public signal conditional on estimations E1 and E2 (OptD2cond), by
regressing the following equation, both for each treatment and for all the treatments taken
together: ∣∣∣∣D2it −XitYt −Xit
∣∣∣∣ = Co+ α ∣∣∣∣ (10−D1it)10 E1it + D1it10 E2it
∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
OptD2cond
+(it + νi), (20)
where Co is the constant, α is the estimated coefficient of the optimal decision conditional
on stated expectations; it + νi is the error term.
All Tr1 Tr2 Tr3 Tr4 Tr5 Tr6 Tr7
Const 0.5066*** 0.3332*** 0.1698*** 0.3476*** 0.3048*** 0.7256*** 0.3945*** 0.2109***
(0.0490) (0.0106) (0.0631) (0.0443) (0.0328) (0.0492) (0.0403) (0.0540)
OptD2cond 0.1488** 0.4470*** 0.7750*** 0.1636* 0.4679*** 0.0052 0.1999** 0.6085***
(0.0736) (0.0270) (0.0799) (0.0855) (0.0617) (0.0285) (0.0825) (0.0933)
νi 0.1134 0.0986 0.0215 0.1417 0.1468 0.1323 0.0000 0.1220
it 0.1705 0.1466 0.1225 0.2138 0.1510 0.1742 0.1383 0.1436
δ 0.3064 0.3111 0.0298 0.3050 0.4862 0.3659 0.0000 0.4191
N 6014 860 795 848 884 873 883 871
R2within 0.0681 0.2392 0.4070 0.1226 0.2696 0.0000 0.1002 0.3193
R2between 0.7415 0.7029 0.9715 0.6152 0.7422 0.5460 0.0072 0.6756
R2overall 0.2616 0.4527 0.7016 0.2234 0.5604 0.0382 0.0936 0.5144
χ2 4.0909 274.4484 94.1295 3.6562 57.5190 0.0338 5.8643 42.5019
Cluster robust standard errors are reported in the first column to control for individual and group specific heterogeneity among the treatments
For the remaining models, cluster robust standard errors to control for group specific heterogeneity are given in parentheses.
Table 11: Random effects model - Equation (20)
Overall, Table 11 shows that there is a significant and positive relation between estima-
tions E1 and E2 and the decision D2 at the individual level and for all treatments, except
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Treatment 5.
B.4 Treatment effect: an analysis on individual data
We perform a treatment comparison for the individual weight put on the public signal in
D2. We observe similar patterns in terms of treatment comparisons as in the analysis of
aggregate data relying on non-parametric tests.
Weight on Y in D2
Eq. (12) Eq. (20)
Baseline (TR1) 0.5653*** 0.5460***
(0.0239) (0.0748)
TR2 0.1181** 0.1033*
(0.0517) (0.0542)
TR3 -0.1825*** -0.1834***
(0.0601) (0.0688)
TR4 -0.0442 -0.0425
(0.0799) (0.0737)
TR5 0.0968* 0.0856*
(0.0518) (0.0450)
TR6 -0.1048*** -0.1147***
(0.0250) (0.0271)
D1it
10 0.1038***
(0.0192)
OptD2cond 0.1272
(0.1086)
νi 0.1824 0.1117
it 0.1755 0.1717
δ 0.5193 0.2975
N 5143 5143
R2within 0.0182 0.0606
R2between 0.3492 0.4187
R2overall 0.2393 0.2949
χ2 104.9290 95.0009
Cluster robust and bootstrap standard errors are given in parentheses
Bootstrap: 3000 replication
Table 12: Random effects model - Comparisons to Treatment 1
The interpretation of Tables 12, 13, and 14 is the following. Consider for example the
first column of Table 12. Each treatment should be compared to the baseline, which is in the
present case, Treatment 1 (the value is that of the constant). Treatment 2 affects the depen-
dent variable (Weight on Y in D2) positively and significantly compared to the baseline.
In other words, TR2 compared to TR1 increases significantly the dependent variable by an
effective size of 0.1181. Similarly, Treatment 6 significantly and negatively affects the de-
pendent variable compared to the baseline.26 The coefficient for D1it measures the effect of
decision 1 on the dependent variable while all the other explanatory variables are constant.
26Note that the baseline (TR1) is the reference and is similar to the constant in the regression analysis of Tables
5 and 11, where all the other treatments (TR2, TR3, TR4, TR5, TR6) are the slopes for each treatment respectively.
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Weight on Y in D2
Eq. (12) Eq. (20)
Baseline (TR2) 0.6881*** 0.3275***
(0.0462) (0.0492)
TR4 -0.1621* -0.0753
(0.0866) (0.0509)
TR7 -0.1405** -0.0846**
(0.0592) (0.0348)
D1it
10 0.0947***
(0.0235)
OptD2cond 0.5583***
(0.0561)
νi 0.1975 0.1100
it 0.1692 0.1408
δ 0.5767 0.3792
N 2550 2550
R2within 0.0144 0.3176
R2between 0.2514 0.7642
R2overall 0.1970 0.6019
χ2 24.1014 158.0893
Cluster robust and bootstrap standard errors are given in parentheses
Bootstrap: 3000 replication
Table 13: Random effects model - Comparisons to Treatment 2
Weight on Y in D2
Eq. (12) Eq. (20)
Baseline (TR3) 0.3898*** 0.3814***
(0.0519) (0.0706)
TR5 0.2870*** 0.2855***
(0.0748) (0.0811)
TR7 0.1651** 0.1652**
(0.0690) (0.0770)
D1it
10 0.0810**
(0.0324)
OptD2cond 0.0815
(0.1291)
AvD1itothers
0.0069**
(0.0032)
νi 0.1948 0.1341
it 0.1925 0.1898
δ 0.5060 0.3329
Obs 2592 2592
R2within 0.0096 0.0368
R2between 0.3349 0.3677
R2overall 0.2105 0.2404
χ2 36.4934 20.3457
Cluster robust and bootstrap standard errors are given in parentheses
Bootstrap: 3000 replication
Table 14: Random effects model - Comparisons to Treatment 3
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